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
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M A X I M S
AND
MORAL REFLECTIONS.

BY
THE DUKE
DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT.

AN IMPROVED EDITION.

L O N D O N:
PRINTED FOR WILLIAM LANE
AT THE
Minerva-Press,
LEADENHALL-STREET.



P R E F A C E.

THE Public is here presented with a New Translation of the MORAL MAXIMS of Francis the Sixth, Duke de la Rochefoucault: a performance of such estimation, that its noble Author lived to see five or six Editions of it: and since his death it has run through very many more; not to mention Translations. As far as the two languages permit, the Translator has followed in the disposition of the

A 2 Maxims

Maxims the alphabetical order of Mr. Amelot de la Houffaye, to whom he is also beholden for many well-collected authorities from the judicious Tacitus, and some other ancient writers. In his own notes he has chiefly aimed at the explanation, or illustration, of his Author's system. He has rejected such maxims as were manifest repetitions, or apparently spurious; and retained only such as, after comparison of the best Editions, he concluded to be genuine. He has also taken great care to *express the sense of the Original* (in which the English Translations have been hitherto defective;) and at the same time (what none of them have attempted) to do the Duke de la Rochefoucault the justice to make him *speak English*.

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT.

UNCOMMON talents, cultivated by a finished education, formed in the **DUKE de la ROCHEFOUCAULT** one of the brightest ornaments of the Court in which he shone: honoured, in the highest degree, by his Sovereign—celebrated by all who were capable of estimating true merit. In the army, signalized by a zeal and bravery worthy himself,—at once accomplished, generous, and the soldier. But,

he yet aspired to a new species of glory, that of forming the taste of the French nation.

To the amiable and excellent character of our illustrious Author, the Marchioness de Sevigné bears abundant testimony. Speaking of him in his last illness, says this elegant writer, "Nor has he passed his life in making
" Reflections and Maxims to no purpose; he has thereby rendered death
" so familiar to him, that the aspect is
" neither new nor shocking." He died at Paris in 1680, aged 63.

With respect to the present edition of these Maxims it may be proper to observe, that it is not merely a republication of the former in 1749. The Translation has been revised with that care, and that freedom, which became

necessary upon consulting the original. From this, and various additional notes, the edition now submitted to the Public may have obtained, it is hoped, no small advantage. After all, to transfuse into a translation with conciseness and perspicuity, the peculiar force and spirit of the original, is rather to be attempted than accomplished.

High in esteem as these Maxims are held, it is not to be denied that the noble Author stands charged with being a censor much too severe; giving ill constructions to indifferent actions; and even to good ones—ascribing unworthy motives.

In favour of our Author's system it is on the other hand alledged, that perfect virtue, in the present state of things, is not to be found; that a mixture of

error

error and truth constitutes too many of our actions; that the heart of man is corrupted by pride, seduced by self-love, encompassed by bad example; that certain human actions, mistaken by the world for virtues, are really no more than their resemblances; that in spite of the efforts of Reason, Pride and Self-love never fail to lurk in the recesses of the heart, and too often, through its motions and inclinations, to diffuse their venom.

That these Maxims contributed more than any other work to form a taste, and give a true relish for propriety and correctness, we have the testimony of no less a writer than M. de Voltaire. “ Though (says he) there is but
“ one truth running through the whole
“ piece, namely, that self-love is the
“ spring

“ spring of all our actions and deter-
 “ minations; this thought presents it-
 “ self under such a variety of forms, as
 “ never fail to strike with new surprize.
 “ This little collection was much read
 “ and admired; it accustomed our au-
 “ thors to think, and to comprize their
 “ thoughts in a lively, correct, and de-
 “ licate turn of phrase; which was a
 “ merit utterly unknown to any Euro-
 “ pean writer before him, since the
 “ revival of letters. § His Memoirs †
 “ are still read, and his Maxims *are*
 “ *known by heart.*”

In the Earl of Chesterfield's Letters,
 we frequently view his Lordship both
 as an admirer and defender of our
 Author. “ La Rochefoucault is, I
 “ know,

§ Siècle de Louis XIV.

† D'Anne d' Autriche.

“ know, blamed, (says his Lordship)
“ but, I think, without reason, for de-
“ riving all our actions from the source
“ of self-love. For my own part, I
“ see a great deal of truth, and no
“ harm at all, in that opinion. It is suf-
“ ficient that we seek our own happi-
“ ness in every thing we do ; and it is as
“ certain that we can only find it in
“ doing well, and in conforming all our
“ actions to the rule of right reason,
“ which is the great Law of Nature.
“ It is only a mistaken self-love that is
“ a blameable motive, when we take
“ the immediate and indiscriminate
“ gratification of a passion, or appetite,
“ for real happiness. But am I blame-
“ able, if I do a good action with a
“ view to the happiness which that ho-
“ nest consciousness will give me ?
“ Surely

“ Surely not. On the contrary, that
“ pleasing consciousness is a proof of
“ my virtue§” Again, “ Read in the
“ morning some of La Rochefoucault’s
“ Maxims ; consider them, examine
“ them well, and compare them with
“ the real characters you meet in the
“ evening.†—Till you come to know
“ mankind by your own experience,
“ I know no thing, nor no man,
“ that can, in the mean time, bring
“ you so well acquainted with them
“ as Le Duc de la Rochefoucault.
“ His little book of Maxims, which
“ I would advise you to look into,
“ for some moments at least, every
“ day of your life, is, I fear, too like
“ and too exact a picture of Human
“ Nature.

§ L. 129.

† L. 225.

“ Nature. I own, it seems to de-
“ grade it, but yet by experience
“ does not convince me that it degrades
“ it unjustly.”§

“ Would you know man indepen-
“ dently of modes, read La Rochefou-
“ cault, who I am afraid paints him
“ very exactly.†”

After such eminent testimonies to an
established fame, the reader will hardly
expect any apology for offering to his
perusal an improved edition of

**THE DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCALT'S
MAXIMS.**

L. D.

§ L. 273.

† L. 210.

M A X I M S.

ABILITY.

I.

THE height of ability consists in a thorough knowledge of the real value of things, and of the genius of the age in which we live.*

2. To

* Tacitus says of Seneca, "*amœnum illi ingenium, et temporis illius auribus accommodatum.*" He had a pleasing genius, which was well adapted to the times he lived in.

Most of the authors immortalized by their contemporaries, have been indebted to this knowledge; or to the good fortune of living in times with which their abilities coincided. The Augustian age, fond of their new acquaintances the Greek writers, advanced to the pinnacle of fame all such Romans as imitated them tolerably well. Hence the undeserved reputation of some of the authors of that Period.

Among

2. To know when to conceal our ability, requires no small degree of it*

3. Few of us have abilities to know all the ill we occasion.

4. There are some affairs, as well as some distempers, which by ill-timed remedies are made much worse: great ability is requisite to know the danger of applying them.†

ACCIDENTS.

5. No accidents, are so unlucky, but what the prudent may draw some advantage from; nor are there any so lucky,

Among ourselves, the last age considered Poetry as comprehending all qualifications, even those of ambassadors and secretaries of state: the present, on the contrary, thinks it scarce worth reading.

* “Unus ex legatis (Helvetiorum) Claudius Cossus, notæ facundię; sed *dicens artem apta trepidatione occultans; atque, eo validior, militis animum mitigavit.*” Tac. H. i. Claudius Cossus was a man of known eloquence; but he knew when to conceal it, and appeased a mutiny of the soldiery by feigning a panic.

† “*Felix intempestivis remediis delicta accendebat.*” Tac. A. xii. Felix increased disorders, by unreasonable reformations.

“*Omittere*”

lucky, but what the imprudent may turn to their prejudice.

6. Accidents sometimes happen, from which a man cannot extricate himself without a degree of madness.

ACTIONS.

7. Great actions, the lustre of which dazzles us, are by politicians represented as the effects of deep design; whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Anthony, supposed to be owing to the ambition of giving a master to the world, arose probably from jealousy.*

B 2

8. Men

“ *Omittere potius prævalida et adulta vitia, quam hoc adsequi, ut palm fieret quibus flagitiis impares essemus.*” Tac. A. iii. There are inveterate disorders, which it is more prudent to connive at, than to manure our impotence by a vain attempt to suppress. “ *Nocuit (Galba) antiquus rigor et nimia severitas, cui non pares non sumus.*” Tac. H. i. Galba hurt himself by acting up to the severity of the ancient laws, which the times could not bear.

* Pliny the historian says, that the Social War had its rise from a private quarrel between Livius Drusus and Cæpio, about a ring under sale, for which they bid against each other.

8. Men boast of great actions but they are oftener the effects of chance than design.

9. Our actions by some are supposed to be under the influence of good or bad stars, to which they owe the praise or blame they meet with.*

10. The most brilliant action ought not to pass for *great* when it is not the effect of great design.

11. Between our designs and our actions a certain proportion should be observed, would we reap, from both, the advantages they might produce.

12. Our actions are like the terminations of verses, which we rime as we please. †

13. Often

* A thousand superstitions of this sort were furnished by the Religion of the Pagans, which served to raise their hopes as well as fears.

† Actions, in themselves, are indifferent; the motives and the end are what characterize them.

13. Often should we be ashamed of our best actions, were the world to witness the motives which produce them.

14. To praise great actions with sincerity, may be said to be taking part in them.

ACCENT.

15. The accent of a man's native country is as strongly impressed on his mind as on his tongue.

ADVICE.

16. Of nothing are we so liberal as advice.

17. Nothing is less sincere than our manner of asking or of giving advice. He who asks advice, and seems to have a respectful deference for the opinion of his friends, aims only at getting his own approved, and making that friend responsible for his conduct. On the other hand, he who gives advice, repays.

repays the confidence supposed to be placed in him by a seemingly disinterested zeal, whilst he seldom means more than his own interest or reputation.*

18. To know how to profit by good advice, requires nearly as much ability as to know how to act for one's self.

19. We may give advice, but we cannot give conduct.

AFFECTATION.

20. Never are we made so ridiculous by the qualities we have, as by those we affect to have. An affectation of wisdom often prevents our becoming wise.

21. Better is it to appear to be what we are, than to affect to be what we are not.

AFFLIC-

* Lord Shaftesbury, in his Soliloquy, says, "No one was ever the better for advice: in general, what we called giving advice was properly taking occasion to shew our own wisdom at another's expence; and to receive advice was little better than tamely to afford another the occasion of raising himself a character from our defects."

AFFLICTION.

22. Whatever we may pretend, self-interest and vanity are the usual sources of our afflictions.

23. In affliction there are several kinds of hypocrisy. Under the idea of weeping for the loss of the person who was dear to us, we weep in reality for ourselves: we weep over the diminution of our fortune, of our pleasure, of our importance. Thus have the dead the honour of tears which in fact stream for the living. I call this a sort of hypocrisy, for we impose on ourselves. But there is another sort of hypocrisy, which is less innocent, because it imposes on the world: and that is the affliction of such as aspire to the glory of unceasing sorrow. When time, which consumes all things, has worn out the grief which they really had, still they persist in tears, lamentations, and sighs. They assume a mournful behaviour; and, in all their actions, labour to demonstrate

demonstrate that their affliction will terminate only in death. This disagreeable, this intolerable vanity is common among ambitious women. The sex bars all the paths of glory, and they endeavour to render themselves celebrated, by the ostentation of inconsolable affliction. Yet another species of tears is there, whose shallow spring easily overflows, and as easily dries up. We weep, to acquire the reputation of being tender; we weep, in order to be pitied; we weep, that we may be wept over; we even weep to avoid the scandal of not weeping.

24. For the loss of some friends we regret more than we grieve, for the loss of others we grieve, yet do not regret.

25. Most women lament the death of a lover, not so much from real affection, as because they would appear to be the more worthy of having been beloved.

AGE.

AGE.

26. The approach of old age, generally points out the manner, in which both body and mind will decay.*

27. We arrive at the different periods of life mere novices: we want experience, notwithstanding the number of years we have had to gain it. †

28. Vivacity, increased by age, falls little short of frenzy.

AGREEABLENESS.

29. So superficially do we judge, that common words and actions, spoken and
and

* To a skilful observer, the future defects of a man's mind and body may sometimes be visible from the time he is adult; as a good mechanic, from the accurate inspection of a machine, may perhaps predict where it will decay.

† Age does not necessarily confer experience: nor does even precept; nor any thing but an intercourse and acquaintance with things. And we frequently see those, who have wanted opportunities to indulge their juvenile passions in youth, go preposterous lengths in old age, with all the symptoms of youth, except ability.

and done agreeably, and with some knowledge of the world, often succeed beyond real ability.*

30. Of agreeableness, as distinct from beauty we may say, that it is a symmetry, the rules of which are unknown; a secret conformity of the features to one another, to the complexion, to the carriage.

AMBITION.

31. When the ambitious propose an end to their ambition, they deceive themselves; for, when attained, the end becomes a means.

32. When great men suffer themselves to be subdued by the length of misfortune, they discover that the strength of ambition, not of understanding, was that which supported them.

* "How often have I seen the most solid merit and knowledge neglected, unwelcome, and even rejected; while flimsy parts, little knowledge, and less merit, introduced by the Graces, have been received, cherished, and admired!" L. Chest. Let.

them. They discover too that heroes, allowing for a little vanity, are very much like other men.

33. The greatest ambition, when what it aspires to is unattainable, conceals itself.

34. What seems to be generosity is often ambition disguised; overlooking a small interest in order to gratify a great one.

35. Moderation must not claim the merit of combating and conquering ambition; for they can never exist in the same subject. Moderation is the languor and sloth of the soul; ambition, its activity and ardour.

36. From love we often pass on to ambition; but seldom do we return from ambition to love.

37. An able man will arrange his respective interests, and conduct each in its proper order. Ambition is often injurious, by tempting us to pro-

cute too much at once. By earnestly desiring the less considerable, we lose the most important.

APPEARANCE.

38. In every profession, each individual affects to appear just what he wishes to be steemed. We may say, therefore, the world is composed of nothing but appearances.

APPLICATION.

39. Those who apply themselves much to little things, commonly become incapable of great ones.

40. Few things are in themselves impracticable. It is for want of application, rather than of means, that men fail of success.

AVARICE.

41. Misers mistake gold for their good; whereas it can, at best, be the means of attaining it. †

52. Avarice

42. Avarice is more opposite to economy than liberality,

43. Avarice in the extreme is ever making mistakes. There is no passion that oftener misses its aim; nor on which the present has so much influence, in prejudice of the future.

44. Avarice often produces contrary effects.—Some Sacrifice their present fortunes to dubious and distant expectations; others prefer present advantages, though small, to great ones in future.

C

BENEFITS.

† That there is such an irrational avarice as confines itself to the mere satisfaction arising from heaping up, looking at, and touching gold and silver, without any regard to their use, every age furnishes us with too many examples to admit a doubt.

“ Desire of riches is covetousness, a name used always in signification of blame: because men contending for them are displeas'd with one another attaining them; though the desire in itself to be blamed or allowed, according to the means by which these riches are sought. Ambition, which is a desire of office or precedence, is a name used also in the worst sense, for the reason before mentioned.”
Hobbes, Leviath.

BENEFITS.

45. Men forget not only benefits but injuries: They even hate those who have obliged them; and cease to hate those who have injured them.— An attention to requite kindneſſes, and revenge wrongs, ſeems to be equally unſupportable. †

46. Every one takes a pleaſure in returning ſmall obligations; many there are who acknowledge moderate ones; whilſt few repay great obligations, except with ingratitude.

BUSINESS.

47. The ruſt of buſineſs is ſometimes poliſhed off in a camp; but never in a court.

48. Civility

† “ To have received greater benefits than there
 “ is hope to requite, diſpoſeth to counterfeit love, but
 “ really to ſecret hatred; and puts a man into the
 “ eſtate of deſperate debtor, who, in declining the
 “ ſight of his creditor, tacitly wiſheth him there where
 “ he might never ſee him more. For benefits oblige,
 “ and obligation is thralldom, and unrequitable obligations
 “ perpetual thralldom, which is hateful.

Leviath, p. 48.

CIVILITY.

48. Civility is a desire to attract civility, and to be accounted well-bred.

CLEMENCY.

49. Clemency in princes is poliey, to gain the affections of their subjects.*

50. Clemency, which is deemed a virtue, proceeds sometimes from vanity, sometimes from indolence, often from fear; but generally from a mixture of all three. §

C 2

CON-

*. “*Novum imperium inchoantibus ut illis clementiæ fama.*” Tac. A. iv. In the beginning of a reign, the reputation of clemency is serviceable.

§ Clemency proceeds sometimes from vanity, like that of Tiberius towards Silanus and Cominius, “*Patientiam libertatis alienæ ostentans.*” Tac. A. vi. Making an ostentation of his patience with regard to the liberties that were taken with him.

Sometimes from indolence.] “*Oblivione magis quam clementiâ.*” Tac. A. vi. Rather through forgetfulness than clemency.

Often from fear.] “*Julius Civilis periculo exemptus, præpotens inter Batavos, ne supplicio ejus ferox gens alienaretur.*” Tac. H. i. Julius Civilis, who had great authority among the Batavi, was saved, lest his punishment should irritate that warlike people.

CONDUCT.

51. That conduct sometimes seems ridiculous, the secret reasons of which may be wise and solid. §

CONSTANCY.

52. The constancy of the wife is the art of concealing disquietude.

53. The misfortunes of other people we all can bear with an heroic constancy.

54. Con-

§ That of L. J. Brutus, for example, whose father and eldest brother, Tarquin having murdered, he counterfeited himself a fool, in order to escape the same danger. Tarquin, thinking his folly real, despised the man; and having possessed himself of his estate, kept him as an idiot, merely with a view of making sport for his children. At the death of Lucretia, Brutus, happening to be present, threw off the mask: he drew the poignard reeking from her wound, and lifting it up towards heaven; "Be witness, ye Gods," he cried, "that from this moment I proclaim myself the avenger of the chaste Lucretia's death; from this moment I profess myself the enemy of Tarquin." An amazement seized the hearers! In the sequel, Tarquin was expelled, and Brutus was proclaimed Deliverer of the People:

54. Constancy in love is perpetual inconstancy: it attaches us successively to every one of the good qualities of the person beloved; sometimes giving the preference to one, sometimes to another. Constancy of this kind, therefore, is no more than inconstancy confined to a single object.

55. In love there are two sorts of constancy: one arising from continually finding, in the favourite object, fresh motives; the other from making constancy a point of honour.

56. In misfortune we often mistake dejection for constancy: we endure it without daring to look at it; like cowards, who suffer themselves to be murdered without resistance.

CONTEMPT.

57. In praising the past we sometimes condemn the present; we shew our contempt of what now is, by our esteem for what is no more. §

58. None but the contemptible are apprehensive of contempt.

CONVERSATION.

59. In conversation, confidence has a greater share than wit.

60. We meet with few men who are agreeable in conversation: the reason is, we think more of what we have to advance, than of what they have to answer. Even those who are most happy in address and politeness, fancy they do enough in *feeming* only to be attentive. At the same time their eyes and minds betray a distraction with respect to what is addressed to them; and an impatience to return to what they themselves were saying; not reflecting that to be thus studious to gratify themselves

§ We condemn the present by praising the past. This is the common track of satire. "Credo pudicitiam Saturno rege moratam in terris." I believe there was such a thing on earth as chastity in Saturn's reign, says Juvenal. And this is no inconsiderable effort of poetical faith. To believe that things have always been as they are, seems reasonable enough; but to believe, because things are thus now, that they therefore were oppositely different formerly, approaches methinks to a *Credo quia impossibile*.

selfes is a poor way of pleasing or convincing others. To hear patiently, and answer precisely, are the great perfections of conversation. §

COPIES.

61. The only good copies are those which point out or ridicule bad originals.

COQUETRY.

62. To boast that we never coquet, is itself a sort of coquetry.

63. All women are coquets; though all do not practise coquetry. Some are restrained by fear, some by reason.

64. Women

§ A great genius, speaking of a deceased friend, amongst other qualities observed that, "he was a comfortable hearer."

"I must not omit one thing, which is attention; an attention never to be wholly engrossed by any past or future object, but instantly to be directed to the present one, be it what it will. An absent man can make but few observations; he can pursue nothing steadily, because his absences make him lose his way. They are very disagreeable, and hardly to be tolerated, in old age; but in youth they cannot be forgiven."

64. Women are not aware of the extent of their coquetry.

65. Women find it more difficult to get the better of coquetry than of love.

66. The greatest miracle of love is the reformation of a coquet.

67. Those are afraid of appearing before the person they love, who have been coqueting elsewhere. †

68. Coquets take pride in appearing to be jealous of their lovers, in order to conceal their envy of other women.

COWARDICE.

69. Few cowards know the extent of their fear.

CRIMES.

70. Some crimes are held to be innocent, and even glorious, from their
splendor,

† Coquets are those who studiously excite the passion of love, without meaning to gratify it. The male coquets are nearly as numerous as the female.

splendor, number, and excess: hence, public theft is called address, and to seize unjustly on provinces, is to make conquests. †

71. We easily forget crimes which are known only within ourselves. §

72. There are persons of whom we never believe ill till we see it: but there are none at whom we ought to be surpris'd when we do see it.

73. Those who are themselves incapable of great crimes are ever unsuspecting of others.

CUNNING.

† “ Id in summa fortuna æquius quod validius; sua retinere privatæ domus, de alienis certare regiam laudem.” Tac. A. xv. Power is the justice of sovereigns: it is for private persons to preserve their own, but for princes to seize what belongs to others.

“ Auferre, truc dare, rapere, falsis nominibus, imperium; atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.” Tac. in Agric. To ravage, plunder, and murder, is to reign: to desolate a country is to pacify it.

§ “ Innocentem quisque se dicit, respiciens testem, non conscientiam.” Sen. Ep. III. Most people fancy themselves innocent of those crimes of which they cannot be convicted.

CUNNING.

74. The highest degree of cunning is a pretended blindness to snares which are evidently laid for us. Men are never so easily deceived as while they are plotting to deceive others. †

75. Those who possess most cunning, always affect to condemn it in others: they use it on great occasions, and to some great end.

76. Common cunning by no means denotes genius: it frequently happens that those who use it as a cover in one place, lay themselves open in another.

77. Cunning and treachery proceed often from want of capacity.

78. One way to be cheated, is to fancy ourselves more cunning than others.

79. We

The English have a law maxim, *Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare*. No man is legally compellable to accuse himself.

† *Solum insidiarum remedium est, si non intelligantur.* Tac. A. xiv. The best defence against a secret enemy is, to make him believe you are not aware of his snares.

79. We are angry with those who trick us, because they appear to have more cunning than ourselves.

80. One man may be more cunning than another; but not more so than all the world.

81. Subtilty in the extreme is false delicacy: true delicacy is solid subtilty.

CURIOSITY.

82. There are two kinds of curiosity. One of them, arising from interest, instigates us to learn what may be useful; the other arising from pride, makes us eager to know what others are ignorant of. §

DEATH.

§ "Curiosity," says Hobbes, "is a desire to know why and how! such as is in no living creature but man; so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion, from other animals; in which the appetite of food, and other pleasures of sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a lust of the mind, that, by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure."

Laviath, p. 26.

DEATH.

83. Few people are well acquainted with death. It is generally submitted to through stupor and custom, not resolution: most men die merely because they cannot help it.

84. Neither the sun nor death are to be steadily looked at.

85. Criminals at execution affect constancy, and contempt of death; which, in fact, is nothing more than the fear of facing it. Their constancy may be to the mind what the cap is to the eyes.

86. It may be proper to say something of that falacy called a contempt of death: I mean that contempt which the heathens boasted to derive from their natural strength, unsupported by the hopes of a better life. There is a wide difference between suffering death courageously, and despising it: the one is common enough; the other I believe

lieve never to be sincere. Every thing has been written to persuade us that death is no evil; and some of the weakest as well as the greatest men have given celebrated examples in confirmation of this tenet. Yet I doubt whether any person of good sense ever thought so. The pains we take to persuade ourselves and others of it, plainly evince that it is no easy task. A man may, for many reasons, be disgusted with life; but he can have no reason for contemning death. Even suicides esteem it no slight matter; and are as much startled at it, and decline it as much as other people, when it comes in any other shape than that which they have chosen. The remarkable inequality in the courage of valiant men, proceeds from death appearing differently to different imaginations, and seeming to be more instant at one time than another. By this means it happens, that, after having contemned what they did not

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know,

know, they are at last afraid of what they do know. We must avoid the consideration of death in all its circumstances, if we would not think it the greatest of all ills. The wisest and bravest are those who make the best pretences for considering it the least : for every one that views it steadily will find it sufficiently terrible. The necessity of dying made the whole of philosophic fortitude. The philosophers thought it best to do that with a good grace which was not to be avoided ; and, being unable to make themselves immortal, they did every thing to immortalize their reputations, and to save what they could out of the general wreck. To be able to put a good face on the matter, by no means must we discover, even to ourselves, all we think about it. Let us trust rather to constitution, than to those vain reasonings which make us believe we can approach death with indifference. The glory of dying resolutely ; the hope of

being regretted ; the desire of leaving a fair reputation ; the certainty of being delivered from the miseries of life ; and being freed from the caprice of fortune, are alleviating reflections, not indeed to be rejected ; but let us by no means imagine them infallible. These serve perhaps to give us courage : just as, in war, a very hedge emboldens the soldier to approach incessant firing. At a distance, he views it as a shelter ; when near, how sorry a defence ! We flatter ourselves too much, in fancying that, death when nigh, will appear just as we judged of it when distant ; and that our opinions, which are weakness itself, will be firm enough not to give way on this severest of trials. We must also be ill acquainted with the effects of self-love, to imagine that even this will permit us to think lightly of a blow which must necessarily be its destruction. Reason, from which we expect such mighty assistance, will prove too feeble, on this occasion, to make

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credible

credible even what we wish to find true. It is reason, on the contrary, that betrays us; and, instead of inspiring a contempt of death, helps to discover its horrors. Indeed, all she can do is, to advise us to avert our eyes, and fix them on some other object. Cato and Brutus chose noble ones. A valet once amused himself with dancing upon the very scaffold on which he was to be broken. Thus different motives sometimes produce the same effect. And so true it is, that whatever disproportion may be found between the great and the vulgar, we often see them meet death much alike; with this difference indeed—the contempt of death affected by heroes, is owing to a love of glory, which conceals it from their sight: † in common people it proceeds merely

† The contempt of death has been accounted a virtue of the first class. Virgil makes it essential to the character of a happy man:

“*Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum,
 Subject pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.*”
 He must be superior to every fear; even that of death, and its consequences.

merely from that insensibility, which leaves them at liberty to think of something else.

DECEIT.

87. To be deceived by our enemies, or betrayed by our friends, is unsupportable; yet by ourselves are we often content to be so treated:

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88. It

The fear of death is peculiar to man; and may perhaps be a necessary instinct to counterbalance reason, which might else, too frequently, prompt him to quit his post; according to that noble thought of Lucan,

“Victurosque die celant, ut vivere durent,
“Felix esse mori.”

The gods conceal from men the happiness of death, that they may endure life.

And though we find this instinct operating sufficiently in men, when under no immediate pressure, we may yet observe that it is surmountable: by the exertion of every passion, even in the weakest, and most timid people: of this the numberless examples we continually see will not admit a doubt. Nor are there wanting, among the few philosophic men who have been superior to instinct, instances of such as have given *the irrefutable demonstration, the irrevocable proof*, in confirmation of their rational fortitude, and sincere contempt of the bugbear death; which, without
passion's

88. It is as easy to deceive ourselves without perceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive others without being perceived.

89. A resolution never to deceive others, exposes a man to be deceived himself.

90. Dulness is sometimes a sufficient security against the attack of a deceitful man. §

91. He

passion's aid they have encountered, with *un-averted eyes*, and *undiverted attention*, Nerva's death is thus related by Tacitus: "Cocceius
 " Nerva, continuus principis, omnis divini hu-
 " manique juris sciens, integro statu, corpore
 " illæso, moriendi consilium cepit. Quid ut
 " Tiberio cognitum, adfidere, causas requirere,
 " addere preces; fateri postremo grave conscien-
 " tiæ, grave famæ suæ, si proximus amicorum,
 " nullis moriendi rationibus, vitam fugeret.
 " Averfatus sermone Nerva, abstinentiam, cibi
 " conjunxit." A. l. vi Cocceius Nerva, a man well skilled in human and divine laws, in high favour, and in good health, came to a resolution to destroy himself. When the Emperor was informed of it, he attended him, inquired into his reasons, entreated him to desist; and even confessed that it would lie on his own conscience, and be pernicious to his fame, to have his best friend destroy himself, without the least apparent reason. But Nerva declined the conversation, and starved himself to death.

91. He who imagines he can do without the World, deceives himself much: but he who fancies the world cannot do without Him, is under a far greater deception.

92. In love, the deceit generally outstrips the distrust.

93. It is far happier to be deceived than undeceived by those we love. †

94. Should even our friends deceive us, though we have a right to be indifferent to their professions, we ought ever to retain a sensibility for them in misfortune.

95. Those

§ “ It is no easy thing to stick soft cheese on
“ a hook.”—Diogenes Laert.

† And we may cry out with Horrace's madman,
“ *Pol me occiditis, amici,*
“ *Non servâstis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas,*
“ *Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.*
My friends, 'twere better you had stop'd my
breath;
Your love was rancour, and your cure was
death.
To rob me thus of pleasure so refin'd,
The dear delusion of a raptur'd mind.

95. Those whom we deceive, appear to us less ridiculous, than we appear to ourselves when deceived by others.

DECENCY.

96. Decency is the least of all laws: but the most strictly observed.

DESIRE.

97. It is much easier to suppress a first desire, than to satisfy those that follow.

98. Before we passionately desire what another enjoys, we should examine into the happiness of its present possessor.

99. We never desire ardently what we desire rationally.

100. Were we perfectly acquainted with the object, we should never passionately desire it. †

DIFFI-

† Sir Thomas More says, "the world is undone by looking at things at a distance."

DIFFICULTY.

101. It is difficult to determine whether a clear, sincere, and honest procedure, be the effect of probity or artifice.

DISGUISE.

102. Were we to take as much trouble in being what we ought to be, as we take in disguising what we really are, we might appear like ourselves, without being at the trouble of any disguise at all.

103. We are so used to disguise ourselves to others, that at last we become disguised to ourselves.

104. Some disguised falsehoods are so like truths that it would be judging ill not to be deceived by them.

DISTRUST.

105. Our own distrust somewhat justifies the deceit of others. §

106. That

§ “ Multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli ;
 “ et alijus peccandi suspicando fecerunt.” Sen.
 Ep iii. Many men provoke others to over-reach them by excessive suspicion ; their extraordinary distrust in some sort justifying the deceit.

106. That which commonly hinders us from shewing an openness of heart to our friends, is a distrust not so much of them as of ourselves.

107. How much soever we distrust the sincerity of others, we always suppose them to be more ingenious with ourselves than with any one else.

ELOQUENCE.

108. In an orator, there is as much eloquence in the tone of his voice, his look, and his gesture, as in the choice of his words.†

109. True

† “ The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense, *quantum sufficit*; add a little application to the rules and orders of the House [of Commons;] throw obvious thoughts in a new light; and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of stile. Take it for granted, that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyze nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface.”

Lord Chesterfield's *Lett.* 272.

“ The manner of your speaking is full as important as the matter; as more people have ears to be tickled, than understandings to judge.” *Lett.* 97.

109. True eloquence consists in saying what is proper, but nothing more.

EMPLOYMENT.

110. It is easier to appear worthy of those employments of which we are *not*, than of those of which we *are* possessed.

111. We appear great in employment that is below our merit: but little enough in one that is above it. §

ENCOMIUMS.

112. No encomiums are thought too great for prudence: yet prudence ensures not the least event.

ENVY.

113. Those who imitate us, we like much better than those who endeavour to

§ Tacitus says of Galba, that while he was a subject, he seemed above his condition; and, had he never attained the imperial dignity, every body would have judged him deserving of it.

“ Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit; et
 “ omnium con sensu capax imperii, nisi imperaf-
 “ set. H. i.

to equal us. Imitation arises from esteem, competition from envy. †

114. We sometimes glory in the most criminal passion; but the passion of envy is so shameful, we dare not even own it.

115. Jealousy is, in some sort, rational and just; it aims at the preservation of a good which belongs, or which we think belongs, to us; whereas envy is a frenzy that cannot endure, not in idea, the good of others.

116. Our approbation of those who are just entering upon the world, is too often owing to our envy of those who are well settled in it.

117. Pride, which excites envy, often helps us to moderate it.

118. Envy

† “ Non ita certandi cupidus, quam propter
“ amorem,

“ Quod te imitari aveau.”

Lucret.

The chiefest glory of the Grecian state
I strictly trace, willing to imitate.

118. Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred.

119. Envy is destroyed by true friendship, as coquetry is by true love.

120. Envy always outlives the felicity of its object.

121. More persons are free from interested views, than from envy.

EXAMPLE.

122. Nothing is so contagious as example. Never was there any considerable good or ill action, that hath not produced its like. We imitate good ones through emulation; and bad ones through that malignity in our nature, which shame conceals, and example sets at liberty.

FAMILIARITY.

123. Familiarity is a sort of suspension of the laws of civility: libertinism has introduced it into society under the notion of ease.

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FAULTS.

FAULTS.

124. We need not be much concerned about such faults as we have the courage to own.

125. We acknowledge our faults, in order to repair, by sincerity, the hurt they do us in the opinion of others.

126. We confess small faults, by way of insinuating that we have no great ones.

127. It is strength of mind to acknowledge our faults, as well as our perfections: to be insensible to what is good as well as to what is bad, in our composition, is certainly weakness.

128. Had we no faults of our own, we should take less pleasure in observing those of others.

129. We often appear to be more agreeable in our faults than in our good qualities.

130. The greatest faults are the faults of Great Men.

131. Dishonest

131. Dishonest men endeavour to conceal their faults from themselves, as well as from others : honest men know and confess them.

132. There are some faults which, when well managed, make a better figure than virtue itself.

133. We are not so bold as to say that we have no faults, and that our enemies have no good qualities ; but in some cases we seem to think so.

134. We have few faults that in themselves are not more excusable than the means which we use to conceal them.

135. We boast of faults we have not, which are the opposites to those we really have : thus, if we are irresolute, we glory in being thought obstinate.

136. We easily excuse, in our friends, faults by which we ourselves are not affected.

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137. We

137. We endeavour to get reputation by such faults as we determine not to amend.

138. As if men thought they had not faults enough, they increase the number by certain affected singularities; these are cultivated so carefully, that at last they become a sort of natural defects beyond our power to reform.

FIDELITY.

139. Fidelity, in most men, is one of the arts of self-love, to procure confidence. It is the means to raise us above those very persons, of whose momentous concerns we make ourselves the depositaries.

140. It is more difficult to be faithful to a mistress, when on good terms with her, than when on bad.

FLATTERY.

141. We should enjoy little pleasure, were we never to flatter ourselves.

142. Where

142. Were we not to flatter ourselves, the flattery of others would never hurt us. †

143. Flattery may be considered as a sort of bad money, to which our vanity gives currency.

144. We sometimes fancy that we hate flattery, whilst we hate only the manner of it.

FOLLY.

145. How closely doth folly attend us through life ! When a man seems to be wise, it is merely that his follies are proportionate to his age and his fortune.

146. He who lives without folly is not so wise as he imagines

147. To affect to be wise by one's self, is egregious folly.

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148. Some

† " Adulatione servilia fingeant, securi de fragilitate credentis." Tac. A. xvi. Men flatter us, because they can depend on our credulity.

148. Some follies are like contagious distempers.

149. There are certain people who are fated to be fools ; they not only commit follies by choice, but are even constrained to do so by fortune.

FORTUNE.

150. Whatever difference may appear in mens fortunes, there is a sort of compensation of good and ill, that makes all equal. †

151. Fortune turns every thing to the advantage of her favourites. §

152. Hap-

† “Magnæ fortunæ pericula.” Tac. A. iv. “Ex mediocritate fortunæ pauciora pericula.” A. xiv. A great fortune runs great risques ; a moderate one is secure.

“Multos, qui conflictari videantur, beatos ; ac plerosque, quamquam magnas, per opes, miserri-
“mos.” Tac. A. vi. Many who seem wretched are happy ; and many are miserable in the midst of riches.

§ “Aderat fortuna etiam ubi artes defuissent.” Tac. H. v. Fortune often compensates for the want of abilities.

152. Happiness and misery depend no less on temper than fortune.*

153. Fortune cures us of many faults which reason cannot. †

154. The bulk of mankind judge of us either by our reputation or by our good fortune. §

155. To be great, we must know how to push our fortune to the utmost.

156. Fortune exhibits our virtues and our vices, as the light exhibits objects.*

157. Fortune

* “ Through certain humours, or passions, and from temper merely, a man may be completely miserable, let his outward-circumstances be ever so fortunate.” Lord Shaftesbury, vol. ii. p. 84.

† *Pauperes necessitas, divites satietas, in melius mutat.* Necessity reforms the poor, and Satiety the rich.

§ “ *Studia militum in Cæcinnam inclinabant, vigore ætatis, proceritate corporis, et quodam inane favore.*” Tac. H. ii. The soldiers were well affected to Cæcinna, because he was in his prime, tall and majestic, and much in vogue.

157. Fortune is ever deemed blind by those on whom she bestows no favours.

158. To be able to answer for what we shall certainly do, we must be able to answer for fortune.

159. We should manage our fortune like our constitution; enjoy it when good, have patience when bad, and apply violent remedies only in cases of necessity.

160. Fortune and caprice govern the world.

FRIEND-

• “ Ambigua de Vespasiano fama; solusque
“ omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus
“ est.” Tac. H. i. Vespasina's reputation was
ambiguous, and he was the first emperor who al-
tered for the better.

“ Primus Antonius nequaquam pari innocentia
“ post Cremonam (excisam) agebat: satisfactum
“ bello ratus seu felicitas in tali ingenio avari-
“ tiam, superbiam, cætaraque occulta mala pate-
“ fecit.” Tac. H. ii. Anthony after his de-
struction of Cremona, behaved no longer with
discretion and moderation: he considered the war
as ended: or perhaps that prosperity would dis-
close his avarice, ambition, and other concealed
vices.

FRIENDSHIP.

161. Friendship, commonly so called, is no more than partnership; a reciprocal regard for each other's interest, and an exchange of good offices. In a word, mere traffic, wherein self-love always proposes to be the gainer.

162. Though most of the friendships of the world ill deserve that name, yet a man may make use of them occasionally, as of a traffic the returns of which are uncertain, and in which it is very common to be cheated.

163. In the distress of our best friends we ever find something not displeasing to us. †

164. The

† This maxim gave occasion to Dr. Swift's celebrated *Verses on his own Death*. The introductory lines give the Dean's opinion of our author, and a poetical version of the maxim :

As Rochefoucault his maxims drew
From nature, I believe them true ;
They argue no corrupted mind
In him ; the fault is in mankind.

This

164. The reason for our being so changeable in friendship is this: it is as difficult to know the qualities of the heart, as it is easy to know those of the head.

165. We love every thing for our own sakes: we follow our own taste and inclination, even when we prefer our friends to ourselves: and yet this preference alone it is, that constitutes true and perfect friendship.

166. It is more dishonourable to distrust a friend, than to be deceived by him.

167. We sometimes fancy that we love men in power: but it is all interest at bottom. We espouse not their party

This maxim, more than all the rest,
Is thought too base for human breast:

“ In all distresses of our friends,

“ We first consult our private ends;

“ While nature, kindly bent to ease us,

“ Points out some circumstance to please us.”

See also Lord Chesterfield's defence of this maxim, Let. 129.

party to do them service, but to render them serviceable to ourselves.*

168. We sometimes slightly complain of our friends, to be beforehand in justifying our own levity.

169. We are not apt to be much afflicted for our friends, when their misfortunes afford us an opportunity of signalizing our affection for them.

170. We are fond of exaggerating the love our friends bear us; but it is less from principle of gratitude than from a desire of prejudicing people in favour of our own merit.

171. We love those who admire *us*, more than those whom *we* admire.

172. Rare is true love; but more rare true friendship.

173. Few

* “Fatebor et fuisse me Sejanus amicum, et ut esse expetisse. Ut quisque Sejanus intimus, ita ad Cæsaris amicitiam valdus.” Tac. a. v.—
I own I was Sejanus's friend, for there was no other road to favour.

173. Few women give into friendship. To those who have experienced love, friendship is insipid. †

174. In friendship as in love, we are often happier in our ignorance than our knowledge.

175. It is difficult to love those whom we do not esteem; but it is full as difficult to love those whom we esteem beyond ourselves.

176. The greatest effort of friendship is, not to the discovery of our faults to a friend, but an endeavour to convince our friend of his own.

177. The charm of novelty, and the charm of long habit, opposite as they are, equally conceal from us the faults of a friend.

178. The generality of friends put us out of conceit with friendship; just as the generality of pious people put us out of conceit with religion.

179. Renewed

† Wine is ever insipid to dram-drinkers.

179. Renewed friendships are to be conducted with greater nicety, than such as have never been broken,

GALLANTRY.

180. Many women there are who never have had one intrigue; few are there who have had only one.

181. We seldom talk of a woman's first intrigue until she has had a second.

182. Love makes the smallest part of gallantry.

183. The gallantry of the mind consists in agreeable flattery,

GLORY.

184. The glory of great men is ever to be rated according to the means used to acquire it.

185. We exalt the reputation of some, in order to depress that of others. We should not extol so much the Prince of Condé and Marshal Turenne, were

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we

we not inclined to lessen one or the other in the competition. †

186. It is as commendable to be proud with respect to one's self, as it is ridiculous to be so with respect to others. §

187. We are unwilling to lose our lives, yet would fain acquire glory. Hence, the brave use more dexterity to avoid death, than men versed in the chicanery of law do to preserve their estates.

GOOD SENSE.

188. Good sense should be the test of all rule, whether ancient or modern. Whatever is incompatible with good sense is false.

GOODNESS.

189. Nothing is more rare than true good-nature. Many who imagine they possess it; have nothing more than a politeness and ease.

190. None

† "Populus neminem sine æmulo finit." Tac. A. xiv. The public gives to every great man a rival.

§ Above all things, says Pythagoras, reverence yourself.

190. None deserve the character of being good, who have not spirit enough to be bad. Goodness, for the most part, is either indolence or impotence.*

191. It is very difficult to distinguish diffusive goodness from great address.

192. A fool has not stuff enough about him to make a good man.

193. The resolute alone can be truly good-natured: those who commonly seem to be so, are weak; and are easily soured.

GRAVITY.

194. Gravity is a mysterious carriage of the body, invented to cover the defects of the mind. †

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GRA-

* “*Segnis, pavidus, et scordia innocens.*” Tac.
H. i. Lazy, timorous, good through stupidity.

Caprice is sometimes a source of goodness :

“ And make a widow happy for a whim.”

Pope.

GRATITUDE.

195. Gratitude, like honesty among traders, helps to carry on business. In trade we often pay, not because we ought, but in order to secure credit another time.

196. Those who discharge their debts of gratitude should not always flatter themselves that they are grateful.

197. The reason for misreckoning in the expected returns of gratitude is this: the pride of giver and receiver can never agree about the value of the obligation.

198. A cer-

† “ The Duke de la Rochefoucault’s definition of gravity deserves to be written in letters of gold. Gravity is an errant scoundrel, and of the most dangerous kind too, because a sly one; and more honest well-meaning people are bubbled out of their goods and money by it in one twelve-month than by pocket-picking and shop-lifting in seven. The very essence of gravity is design, and consequently deceit; a taught trick to gain credit of the world for more sense and knowledge than a man is worth.” Tristram Shandy.

“ Gravity is of the very essence of imposture.”
Lord Shaftesbury.

198. A certain warmth of gratitude there is, which not only acquits us of favours received, but even, while we are repaying what we owe, converts our creditors into debtors. †

199. Gratitude, in most men, arises from a secret desire to receive greater favours.

GRACE.

200. Grace to the body is like good sense to the mind.*

GREAT MEN.

201. Since Great Men cannot bestow either health of body or peace of mind, we certainly pay too dear for all they can bestow.

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HAPPINESS.

† “ A grateful mind
 “ By owing owes not, but still pays; at once
 “ Indebted and discharged.”

Paradise Lost.

* “ They are both the gifts of nature; but they
 “ may be cultivated, increased, and brought to
 “ perfection. Adorn yourself with all those graces
 “ and accomplishments which without solidity are
 “ frivolous; but without which, solidity is to a
 “ great degree useless.”

Ld. Chesterfield's Lett. 182.

HAPPINESS.

202. No person is either so happy, or so unhappy, as he imagines.

203. We are more anxious to appear happy than really to become so.

204. Happiness lies more in imagination than in real possession. We are made happy by obtaining, not what others esteem desirable, but what we ourselves think so. †

HATRED.

205. When our hatred is violent it sinks us beneath even those whom we hate.

206. The hatred of favourites is nothing more than the love of favour. Our indignation at not possessing it
ourselves,

† Horace speaks thus of luxurious eating :

“ Non in caro nidore voluptas
“ Summa, sed in teipso est : tu pulmentaria quære
“ Sudando. Lib. II. Sat. ii.

“ In you consists the pleasure of the treat,
“ Not in the price or flavour of the meat.”

ourselves, is soothed and mitigated by the contempt we express for those who do; and we refuse them our good will, because we are not able to deprive them of that something which procures them the good will of every one else.

HEART.

207. Every man boasts of his heart, but no one dares to speak well of his head.

208. A man may be well acquainted with his head, whilst he is far from being so with his heart.

209. The head is ever the dupe of the heart. §

210. The

§ “ Plusieurs diroient en periode quarré, que
 “ quelques reflexions que fasse l'esprit, et quelques
 “ resolutions qu'il prenne pour corriger ses travers,
 “ le premier sentiment du cœur renverse tous ses
 “ projets. Mais il n'appartient qu'a M. de la Ro-
 “ chefoucault de dire tout en un mot, que, L'esprit
 “ est toujours la dupe du cœur.” Many could
 have said, in a round period, that whatever reflec-
 tions the mind may make, and whatever resolu-
 tions

210. The head cannot long act the part of the heart.

211. Imagination cannot invent so many contrarieties as naturally possess the heart of man.

HEROES.

212. Nature sometimes gives great advantages; but the concurrence of
For-

tions it may take to reform its irregularities, the first motion of the heart overturns all its projects. But the Duke de la Rochefoucault alone can say all this in, "The head is ever the dupe of the heart." *L'Art de Penser.*

"*L'esprit est souvent la dupe du cœur.* If," says Lord Chesterfield, "he had said, instead of '*souvent*,' *presque toujours*, I fear he would have been nearer the truth." But his Lordship, perhaps, quoted from memory; for, in the copies we have consulted, *toujours* is the word. *Cœur* and *esprit* imply so many senses, and *heart* and *mind* so few, that the thought, in our language, so translated, would have been flat. By the heart, however, is to be understood the seat of the *passions*; by the mind the seat of *reason*. Our Author frequently uses the expression.

"*Cœur* and *esprit*," says a french writer, are "fashionable words: we hear of nothing else. We have a book called, *A Quarrel between the Mind and the Heart.*"

Démêlé, du Cœur et de l'Esprit.

Fortune must be obtained to make Heroes.

213. There are heroes in bad, as well as in good actions. †

HOPE.

214. Hope, deceitful as it is, carries us agreeably through life. §

HONOUR.

215. One acquired honour is security for more.

HUMOUR.

† Tacitus says of Pëtroniüs “ Ut alios industria, ita, hunc ignavia, protulerat ad famam; habebaturque non ganeo et profligator, sed erudito luxu.” A. xvi. Others acquire fame by industry; he got it by effeminency: yet he was not accounted a debauchee or spendthrift, but a man of taste in pleasure.

§ It does more; it extends its influence beyond the grave, and helps to reconcile us to the stroke of death.

“ Hope travels through, nor quits us when we
“ die.”

POPE.

HUMOUR.

216. Our own caprice is more extravagant than the caprice of fortune.

217. Fancy it is that fixes the value of the gifts of fortune.

218. Our humour is apt to be more in fault than our understanding.

219. Of the temper of men, as of most buildings, we may say that it has several aspects; some agreeable, some disagreeable.

220. The humours of the body have a regular stated course, and insensibly influence the will; they circulate, and exercise a secret power over us. In fact they have a considerable share in all our actions, though we perceive it not.

221. Through the medium of humour, madmen and fools see every thing. §

222. The

- The jaundiced eye sees every thing yellow.

222. The calm or disquiet of our humour depends less on momentous affairs, than on the trifles that occur daily.

HYPOCRISY.

223. Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.

IDLENESS.

224. It is a mistake to imagine that the violent passions alone, such as ambition and love, can triumph over the rest. Idleness, languid as she is, often governs them all: she influences our designs and our actions; she insensibly consumes both the passions and the virtues.

225. Idleness, timidity, or shame, often keeps us within the bounds of duty; whilst Virtue seems to run away with the honour of it.†

226. Idleness

† “ Metus temporum obtentui, ut quod Seg-
nitia

226. Idleness belongs to the mind more than the body.

JEALOUSY.

227. Under certain circumstances it may not be disagreeable to have a jealous wife; for she will always be talking of what pleases her husband.

228. Those only who avoid giving jealousy are the persons who are deserving of it.

229. Jealousy is born with love, but does not always die with it.

230. Jealousy is nourished by doubt; and, when we arrive at certainty, either becomes madness, or ceases.

231. In

“*nitia erat Sapiaentia vocaretur.*” Tac. H. i.
Timidity sometimes passes for wisdom. “*Genarus*
“*sub Nerone temporum quibus inertia pro sapi-*
“*entia fuit.*” Under Nero it was wisdom to be
inactive.

231. In jealousy there is less of love than of self-love. †

232. A species of love there is, the excess of which prevents jealousy.

233. Jealousy, though the greatest of evils, is the least pitied by those who occasion it.

ILLS.

234. Philosophy easily triumphs over ills both past and future; but present ills triumph over philosophy.

235. The good we have received from any one, should make us bear with the ill we have suffered.

236. To the greater part of mankind it is less dangerous to do an injury, than much service. §

G

237. A wil-

† Witness Rhadamistus, who threw his beloved wife into a river, that she might not fall into the hands of another. Also, "Love and Madness." Case of Hackman and Miss Reay.)

§ "Beneficia eo usque læta sunt, dum videntur
" *exsolvi posse*; ubi multum anteverere, pro gra-

237. A willingness to believe ill, without examination, is the effect of pride and idleness. We are ready to suppose guilt, but unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.

238. Weakness often gets the better of those ills which reason could not.

INCONSTANCY.

239. There is a sort of inconstancy, proceeding from levity or weakness, which gives into every opinion: there is another inconstancy, more excuseable which arises from satiety.

INFIDELITY.

240. We find it more difficult to overlook the least infidelity to ourselves than the greatest to others.

INGRATITUDE.

341. Extraordinary haste to discharge

“*tia odium redditur.*” Tac. A. iv. When benefits are such as can never be repaid, the benefactor is usually hated instead of thanked.

charge an obligation, is a sort of ingratitude.

242. Some ungrateful people are less blamable for their ingratitude, than their benefactors.

243. We seldom find people ungrateful, so long as we are in a condition to serve them.

244. It is no great misfortune to oblige an ungrateful person; but an insupportable one to be under an obligation to a scoundrel.

245. Those on whom we confer benefits we are fonder of, than those from whom we receive them.

INNOCENCE.

246. Innocence finds not near so much protection as guilt.

INTEREST.

247. Interest speaks all languages,
G 2
and

and acts all parts, even the part of *disinterestedness* itself.

248 Interests blinds some people, and enlightens others.

249. The reputation of virtue is as serviceable to interest, as it is to vice.

250. The virtues and vices are all fet in motion by interest.

251. Good-nature, that boaster of sensibility—how often is it stifled by the smallest interest !

252. Through interest alone we condemn vice, and extol virtue.

253. In small interests we venture to disbelieve appearances.

INTREPIDITY.

254. Intrepidity is a wonderful strength of soul, that renders it superior to the trouble, disorder, and emotion which an appearance of danger is apt to excite. By this quality, in the most surprising and dreadful accidents

cidents, heroes maintain tranquillity, and preserve the free use of their reason.

JUSTICE.

255. The love of justice often means no more than the fear of suffering by injustice.

KNOWLEDGE.

256. To know things well, we should know them in detail; but this being in a manner infinite, our knowledge must needs be superficial and imperfect.

LIBERALITY.

257. What we call liberality is seldom more than vanity of bestowing; we are fonder of the vanity than the generosity of the action. †

G 3

LOVE.

† Liberality is not merely the act of giving; it is the noble disposition of the giver.

LOVE.

258. No disguise can long conceal love where it really is, nor feign it where it is not.

259. Since it is no more in our power to love than to avoid it, a lover has no right to complain of his mistress's inconstancy, nor she of her lover's.

260. It is hard to define love. We may say of it, however, that in the soul it is a desire to reign; in the mind, a sympathy: in the body, a secret inclination to enjoy after all difficulties. †

261. Love, in some of its effects, looks more like hatred than kindness. †

262. Most

† This is surely but a dark confused account of love; hardly will any one cry out, after having read it, *Nunc scio quid sit amor*. Hobbes has defined it in fewer words. "It is the love of one's singularity, with a desire to be singularly beloved. "And the same, with fear that the love is not mutual, is jealousy."

† "Quod petiere premunt arcte, faciuntque
"dolorem.

"Cor-

262. Most people are ashamed of their amours when the fit is over.

263. In the original, love is one and the same; but there are a thousand different copies.

264. Love, like fire, subsists by continual motion: when it ceases to hope or fear, it ceases to exist.

265. Love lends its name to many a correspondence, in which he is as little concerned as the Doge, in what passes at Venice.

266. The more you love your mistress, the easier it is to hate her.

267. To love is the least error in a woman who has abandoned herself to love.*

268. There

“Corporis, et dentes illidunt sæpe labellis.”
Lucret. l. iv.

What they desir'd they curst; and 'midst the bliss
Raise pain, when often with a furious kiss
They wound the balmy lip.

• “Viros ad unum quodque maleficium singulæ
“cupidi-

268. There are those who had never been in love, had they never talked of it.

269. The pleasure of love is in loving: we are happier in the passion we feel, than in that we excite.

270. To fall in love, is much easier than to get out of it.

271. Novelty to love, like bloom to fruit, gives a lustre which is easily effaced; but it never returns.

272. Those whom we have once ceased to love, can never be the objects of our love a second time.

273. We

“cupiditates impellunt; mulieres autem ad omnia maleficia cupiditas una ducit.” Cic. l. iv. de Art. Rhet. Single vices make men commit single crimes: but one vice makes women guilty of all. . . . The reason is—That general contempt and ill-usage which custom has made the consequences of the forfeiture of female virtue. For women, finding themselves irrecoverably undone by a single slip, and treated as if nothing could be added to their guilt, stop afterwards at no one crime, because they know that they are thought capable of all.

273. We forgive just so long as we love.

274. In love, we often doubt what we most believe.

275. The man who fancies that he loves his mistress for her own sake, is much mistaken.

276. Young women who would not be coquets, and old men who would not be ridiculous, should never speak of love as in any way concerning themselves.

277. Nothing is more natural and more fallacious, than to persuade ourselves that we are beloved.

278. Of love, those who are first cured, are best cured.

279. In all the passions we commit faults: in love we are guilty of the most ridiculous ones.

280. In the old age of love, as in that of life, we continue to live to pain, though we cease to live to pleasure.

281. We

281. We hear of many cures for love, of which not a single one is infallible.

282. Love, all agreeable as it is, pleases more in its manner than in itself.

283. Women in love forgive great indiscretions sooner than small indelicacies.

284. A lover never sees the faults of his mistress till the enchantment is over.

285. We are nearer loving those who hate us, than those who love us more than we chuse.

286. A man of sense may love like a madman, but never like a fool.*

287. If lovers are never weary of each other, it is because they are always talking of themselves.

288. Love

* Gay tells us, however, that "in love we are all fools alike." Experience perhaps justifies his opinion.

288. Love and prudence are inconsistent ; as the former increases, the latter must decrease.*

MAGNANIMITY.

289. Magnanimity despises all, in order to obtain all.

290. Magnanimity is sufficiently defined by its name : yet we may say that magnanimity is the good sense of pride, and the noblest way of acquiring applause.

MAN.

291. The study of man is abundantly more necessary than the study of books. †

292. Men

* According to Ovid, love and dignity also are inconsistent :

*Non bene convenient, nec in una sede morantur,
Majestas & Amor.*

† “ The proper study of mankind is man,” says Pope. Lord Chesterfield allows that “ learning is “ acquired by reading books ; but the more necessary
“ study

292. Men and things have distinct points of view: some we should see near; of others we judge best at a distance.

293. The truly honest man is he who sets no value on himself.

294. He must needs be honest who is ever open to the inspection of honest men.

295. Most men, like plants, have secret properties, which chance alone discovers.

296. A man often imagines he acts, whilst he is acted upon. His mind aims at one thing; his heart insensibly gravitates towards another.

297. Men

“sary learning, the knowledge of the World, is only to be acquired by reading men, and studying all the various editions of them.” Again, “All are in general, and yet no two in particular, exactly alike. Those who have not accurately studied, perpetually mistake: they do not discern the shades and gradations that distinguish characters seemingly alike, &c. &c.” Let the “great book of the world be your principal study.”

Let. 217. and 243.

297. Men would not live long in society were they not the mutual dupes of each other.

298. Men are treacherous oftener through weakness than design.

MARRIAGE.

299. Convenient marriages, there certainly may be, but there are no delightful ones.

MEMORY.

300. For want of memory every one complains, but nobody of the want of judgment

301. Why have we memory sufficient to retain the minutest circumstances that have happened to us? and yet not enough to remember how often we have related them to the same persons.

MERIT.

302. They who esteem themselves persons of merit, take pride in being
 H unlucky:

unlucky: they persuade themselves, as well as others, that they are worthy of better fortune.

303. To undeceive one who is prejudiced in favour of his own merit, is to render him the bad office that was done to the madman of Athens, who fancied all the vessels which came into that port to be his own. §

304. It

§ This noble Athenian, when recovered from his indisposition, declared, that he never had more pleasure than whilst he was distempered, which he remembered well; adding, that his friends would have obliged him much, to have let him enjoy a happiness that put him in possession of all things, without depriving any one else. Ælian tells this story of Thrasylus.

“ Qui feroit-il, hélas, si quelque audacieux

“ Alloit pour son malheur lui desiller les yeux ?

“ Qu’il maudiroit le jour, ou son ame insensée

“ Perdit l’heureuse erreur qui charmoit sa
penfe.” Boileau, Sat. iv.

Should some officious person open his eye, he would curse the day on which he was deprived of the delightful illusion. See Maxim 95.

304. It is a sign of extraordinary merit, when the envious are forced to praise.*

305. Nature gives merit; but good fortune sets it to work.

306. Some, with great merit, are quite disgusting; others, with great faults, are very pleasing. †

307. Some there are whose merit consists in both saying and doing foolish things seasonably. An alteration of conduct would spoil all. ‡

H 2

308. Mode-

* “ Ne militibus quidem ingrata fuit Celsi salus
 “ *candem virtutem admirantibus cui irascebantur.*”
 The soldiery, who were angry with Celsus, yet wished him well on account of his merit. Tac. H. i.

† “ *Quædam virtutes odio sunt; severitas obstinata, invictus adversum gratiam animus.*”
 Tac. A. xv. There are odious virtues; such as inflexible severity, and an integrity that accepts of no favour.

‡ Those perhaps, who with great faults are very pleasing; mentioned in the former maxim.

308. Moderate qualifications artfully set off, gain more reputation than real merit. §

309. Merit procures us the esteem of men of sense; good fortune procures us that of the public.

310. The affectation of merit is oftener rewarded than merit itself.

311. Merit, like fruit, has its season.

312. We should not judge of a man's merit by his great qualities, but by the use he makes of them.

313. The world, censorious as it may be, is oftener favourable to false merit, than unjust to true.

MODERA-

§ “ Poppæus Sabinus, modicus originis, consulatum ac triumphale decus adeptus, maximif-
 “ que provinciis per viginti quatuor annos impositus,
 “ nullam ob eximiam artem, sed quod *par ne*
 “ *gotiis neque supra erat.*” Tac. A. vi. Poppæus Sabinus, of moderate birth, obtained the consulship, and the honour of a triumph; and governed during twenty-four years the greatest provinces, without any extraordinary merit; being just capable of his employments, and in no manner above them.

MODERATION.

314. The moderation of those who are happy, is owing to nothing more than to the calm that good fortune bestows upon the temper. §

315. Moderation is a dread of incurring that envy and contempt which attend upon intoxicated prosperity. It is an ostentation of the strength of the mind. Moderation in an exalted station is the desire of appearing superior to fortune.

316. We make a virtue of moderation, in order to bound the ambition of great men. Also, to comfort moderate geniuses for their slender fortune, and their slender merit.

H 3

317. Mode-

§ “Tantum honorum atque opum in me cumulasti, ut nihil felicitati meæ desit, nisi moderatio ejus. Cætera invidiam augent.” Tac. A. xiv. You have so loaded me with honours and riches, that nothing can be wanting to my prosperity, but moderation. Any thing more will excite envy.

317. Moderation resembles Temperance: we are not so unwilling to indulge in eating, as afraid of doing ourselves harm by it.

318. Many people despise riches; few know how to bestow them.*

NEGOTIATION.

319. We are often dissatisfied with those who negotiate our affairs, because they sacrifice their friend to the success of the negotiation. Success becomes their own interest through the honour they expect for bringing to
a con-

- “ Cur eget indignus quisquam te divite; quare
“ Templā ruunt antique deūm; cur, improbe,
“ caræ
“ Non aliquid patriæ tanto emetiris acervo ?

Horat.

Then why not better use this proud excess
Of worthless wealth? Why lives in deep distress
A man unworthy to be poor, or why
Our sacred shrines in aged ruins lie?
Why not of such a massy treasure spare
To thy dear country, wretch! a moderate share?
Shalt thou alone no change of fortune know!
Thou future laughter of thy deadliest foe?

a conclusion what they themselves had undertaken.

NARROWNESS OF MIND.

320. Narrowness of mind is often the cause of obstinacy: we believe no farther than we can see. §

OLD AGE.

321. Old age is a tyrant; it forbids the pleasures of youth on pain of death.

322. Few people are qualified to be old.

323. As we grow old we grow foolish as well as wise.

324. Old age gives good advice, when it can no longer give bad example. †

325. Old

§ “Stiff in opinion, always in the wrong.”
Dryden.

† Terence makes a young fellow speak thus of his old father:

“Perii! is mihi, ubi adbibit plus paulo, sua
“quæ narrat facinora!

“Nunc ait, periculum ex aliis facito tibi, quod
“ex-

325. Old fools are more foolish than young ones.

OPPORTUNITY.

326. Opportunities make us known to ourselves as well as to others.

327. In affairs of importance, we ought less to contrive opportunities, than to use them when they offer.

328. Our qualities both good and bad, are uncertain, and dubious, and at the mercy of opportunity.

THE PASSIONS.

329. The duration of our passions is as little in our power as the duration of our lives.

330. The

“ ex usu fiet;
“ Astutus!”

Speaking of another,
Shews how he'd act in such a case himself:
Yet when he takes a sup or two too much,
Oh, what mad pranks he tells me of his own!

Colman.

330. The passions are the only orators that never fail to succeed. They are, as it were, Nature's art of eloquence, fraught with infallible rules. Simplicity with the aid of the passions, persuades more than the utmost eloquence without them.

331. In the heart of man there reigns a perpetual succession of the passions; so that the destruction of one is almost always the production of another.

332. The passions often beget their opposites. Avarice produces prodigality; prodigality avarice: men are often constant through weakness, and bold through fear.

333. When we subdue our passions, it is to be attributed rather to their weakness than to our own strength.

334. So much injustice and self-interest enter into the composition of the passions, that we ought to be on our guard even when they seem most reasonable.

335. Not

335. Notwithstanding all the care we take to conceal our passions under the pretences of religion and honor, they still appear through such flimsy veils.

336. Absence destroys small passions, and increases great ones: the wind extinguishes tapers, but kindles fires.

337. Of the influence of our passions we are by no means aware.

338. The heart, while agitated by the remains of one passion, is more susceptible of another, than when entirely at rest.

339. Those who, during life, are under the influence of strong passions, are happy; but miserable when cured of them. †

340. Passion

† Those who would eradicate all hopes and fears out of the human breast, as the means of happiness, are but ill acquainted with the economy of the mind. The inaction and apathy that are the necessary attendants on such a state would be greater evils than the most unbounded licence of the passions.

340. Passion often makes a fool of a man of sense: sometimes it makes a man of sense a fool.

PENETRATION.

341. The great defect of penetration is not so much in falling short of, as, in going beyond the mark. §

342. Penetration has an air of divination; it pleases our vanity more than any other quality of the mind.

PERSEVERANCE.

343. Perseverance merits neither blame nor praise. It is no more than the duration of our inclinations and sentiments, which we can neither create nor extinguish.

PHILOSOPHERS.

344. Contempt of riches in the old philosophers, was a concealed desire of revenge, by despising the good which

§ ————It is my nature's plague
To spy into abuses; and oft my jealousy
Shapes faults that are not.

Othello.

which Fortune had denied them. It was an artful shelter from the disgrace of poverty: a bye-way to arrive at that esteem which they could not procure by wealth.*

345. Fondness, or, indifference for life with the old philosophers, was the mark of self-love: which ought no more to be controverted than the taste of the palate, or the choice of colours.

346. Philosophy easily triumphs over past and future ills: those ills that are present, however, as easily triumph over that.

PIETY.

347. Piety in old women is a decent way of escaping the disgrace and ridicule

* According to Aristippus's repartee to Diogenes:

“ Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti

“ Nollet Aristippus. Si sciret regibus uti,

“ Fastidire olus qui me nctat.”

Horat Ep. xvii.

His patient herbs could Aristippus eat,
He had disdain'd the tables of the Great.
And he who censures me, the sage replies,
If he could live with kings, would herbs despise.

cule attendant on decayed beauty. It is an endeavour to hold out upon a respectable footing.*

PITY.

348. Pity is a sense of our own misfortunes in those of other people: it is a sort of foresight of the disasters that may befall ourselves. We assist others that they may assist us on like occasions; so that, the services we offer to the unfortunate, are so many anticipated kindnesses to ourselves.†

I 349. The

§ Pope has assigned them another employment,
 “ See how the world its veterans rewards;
 “ A youth of conquests, an *old age of cards*.

† “ Grief for the calamity of another is pity;
 “ and ariseth from the imagination that the like
 “ calamity may befall himself; and therefore is
 “ called also *compassion*, and, in the phrase of this
 “ present time, a fellow feeling: and therefore for
 “ calamity arising from great wickedness, the best
 “ men have the least pity: and for the same ca-
 “ lamity, those hate pity, that think themselves
 “ least obnoxious to the same.” Hobbes’ *Leviath*.
 The celebrated sentence of Terence, “ *Homo*
 “ *sum, humani nihil alienum a me puto*. I am
 “ a man and feel for all mankind,” is indeed the
 same opinion more neatly expressed.

349. The desire of being pitied, of being admired, is commonly the true reason of our confidence.

PLEASING.

350. He who is displeased with every body is more unhappy than he with whom nobody is displeased.

POWER.

351. We have more power than will; we represent things as impracticable, merely by way of exculpating ourselves.*

PRIDE.

352. Pride ever indemnifies itself; and is no loser, even when it renounces vanity.

353. Were

† “*Multa experiendo confieri, quæ seignibus ardua videntur.*” Tac. A. xiii. Indolence persuades us that those things are impracticable which we might easily accomplish.

“Nil.

353. Were we not proud ourselves, we should seldom complain of the pride of others.

354. Pride is equal in all men; it differs only in the means and manner of shewing itself.

355. Nature, which has so wisely adapted the organs of the body to its wants, seems, with the same view to have given us pride:—in order to spare us the pain of knowing our imperfections. †

356. In our reprehensions, pride has a greater share than good-nature. We reprove, not so much in order to correct, as to intimate, that we hold ourselves free from such failings.

I 2

357. Pride

“ Nil tam difficile est quin quærendo investigari possit.” Ter.

Nothing so difficult but may soon be accomplished by industry. Colman.

† “ And pride bestows on all a common friend.”
Pope.

357. Pride would never owe, nor would self-love ever pay.

358. Pride is often increased by what we retrench from our other faults.

359. The same pride that condemns the faults from which we are exempt, inclines us to despise those good qualities of which we are not possessed.

360. In our concern for the misfortunes of our enemies, there is often more pride than benevolence. By shewing our compassion we make them feel our superiority.

361. Nothing flatters our pride more than the confidence reposed in us by the Great: we esteem that to be a tribute to our merit, which proceeds frequently from mere inability to keep a secret. Confidence is relief to the mind oppressed with a load of secrecy. §

362. Pride

§ The difficulty of keeping a secret has been satirized in the story of Midas's barber. Midas endeavouring to hide, under a Phrygian bonnet, the

362. Pride has its caprice, as well as other passions: ashamed to own that we are jealous, we yet value ourselves for having been so, and even for being susceptible of it.

PROMISES.

363. We promise according to our hopes: we perform according to our fears.

PRAISE.

364. The shame that arises from praise undeserved often makes us aspire after what, otherwise, we should never have thought of.

365. We seldom praise those heartily who seem not to admire us.

366. When we seem to blame ourselves we mean only to extort praise.

I 3

367. We

the deformity of his ass's ears. His barber discovering the secret, and not daring to speak out, imparted it to the earth; whence sprung reeds, which divulged it.

367. We seldom give praise without a view to self-interest. Praise is flattery, artfully, concealed, refined: it pleases, with an essential difference; both giver and receiver: the latter takes it as the reward of merit, the former bestows it by way of shewing candour and discernment.

268. Envenomed praise exposes, by a side-blow, such faults as we durst not any other way lay open.†

369. We usually praise with a view to be praised.

370. Few are so wise as to prefer useful reproof to treacherous praise.‡

371. There

† “Pessimum inimicorum genus laudantes.” Tac. Panegyrics are the most dangerous enemies.

‡ “Peritissimis, si consulere, vera dicturis: arcuere eos intimi amicorum Vitellii; ita formatis, principis auribus, ut aspera quæ utilia, nec quidquam nisi jucundum & læsurum acciperet.” Tac. H. iii. Vitellius might have known the truth from the old officers, but his courtiers kept them off; having accustomed him not to hear any thing disagreeable, though useful; but to listen to every thing pleasing and pernicious.

371. There are reproaches which give praise, and there are praises which reproach. §

372. That affected modesty which declines praise, is desirous only of being praised with more delicacy. †

373. Resistance to praise is a desire to be praised twice.

374. An ambition to merit praise, fortifies virtue. Sincere praise, bestowed

§ Pliny relates of Cæsar, that his blame was so artful as to seem praise. "Ita reprehendit, ut laudet." Lib. iii. Ep. xii. "Augustus cum Tiberio tribunitiam potestatem a patribus postulare, quanquam honorifica oratione, quædam de cultu & institutis ejus jecerat, quæ velut excusando exprobraret." Tac. A. When Augustus demanded the tribunitial power of the senate for Tiberius, in an oration made in his praise, he dropped something about his temper and disposition that seemed to accuse while he was excusing him.

§ But Cæsar, never will your Horace hear,
A languid panegyric hurts his ear.

Too strongly guarded from the poet's lays,
He spurns the flatterer and his saucy praise.

stowed on wit, valour, and beauty, ever contributes to their augmentation. §

QUALITIES.

375. Our good qualities more than our bad actions, expose us to persecution and hatred.

376. It is not enough to possess great qualities; unless we have the management of them. †

377. Some

§ The senate, says Tacitus, loaded Nero with praises, to excite the young emperor from the glory acquired by little actions to greater. “Magnis patrum laudibus; ut juvenilis animus, levium quoque rerum gloria sublatus, majores con- tinuaret.” “Sinistra erga eminentes interpre- tatio; nec minus periculum ex magna fama, quam ex mala.” The world is apt to judge unfavourable of eminent merit. A great reputation is as dangerous as a bad one.

† “Brutidium artibus honestis copiosum, & si rectum iter pergeret ad clarissima quæque iturum festinatio extimulabat; dum æquales, dein superiores, anteire parat: quos multos etiam bonos pessumdedit; qui, spretis quæ tarda cum securitate, præmatura vel cum exitio properant.” Tac.
A. iii. Brutidius was possessed of good qualities sufficient

377. Some good qualities, when natural, degenerate into faults; others when acquired, prove imperfect. For example—Nature must give us benevolence and valour; Reason must teach us to be frugal of our fortune and our confidence.

378. Good qualities, like great abilities, are incomprehensible and inconceivable to such as are deprived of them.

379. To live without envy is an indication of great qualities.

380. Bad qualities sometimes constitute great talents.

QUARRELS.

381. Quarrels would never be lasting were the fault only on one side.

RAILLERY,

sufficient to have raised him to the highest dignities, had he not, through precipitation, quitted the usual track; labouring to outstrip first his equals, then his superiors; a rock on which many worthy men have split, while they strove, at the greatest hazard, to obtain prematurely what, with a little patience, they would have had with perfect safety.

RAILLERY.

382. Raillery is more insupportable than reproach ; yet we have a right to resent injuries, but are ridiculous in being angry at a jest.

REASON.

383. We want strength to act up to our reason.

384. A man is not deemed rational merely because chance may throw reason in his way ; he alone is rational who knows, distinguishes, tastes.

RECONCILIATION.

385. Reconciliation with enemies proceeds from the desire of bettering our condition ; from being harassed by the fatigue of war ; or from the apprehension of some untoward event.

REPENTANCE.

386. Repentance is not so much a remorse for what we have done, as the apprehension of consequences.

REPUTATION.

REPUTATION.

387. We except against a judge, in affairs of small moment, but are content that our reputation and glory should be dependent on the decision of men who oppose us, through jealousy, prejudice, or want of discernment: yet it is merely to engage these to determine in our favour that we often hazard our ease and our lives.

388. Whatever be the ignominy we may have incurred, it is generally in our power to re-establish our reputation.*

RIDICULE.

* Particularly by a generous death: as Tacitus says of Sempronius: "Constantia mortis haud indignus Sempronii nomine, vita degeneraverat." A. i. Though he had degenerated from his great ancestors by a disorderly life, he rendered himself worthy of them by his constancy in death.

"Descendam magnorum haud unquam indignus
"avorum." Virg.

Receive a soul unfilled yet with shame,
Which not belies my great forefather's name.

RIDICULE.

389. Ridicule seems to dishonour even more than doth dishonour itself.*

SATISFACTION.

390. A man who finds no satisfaction in himself, seeks for it in vain elsewhere.

SECRET.

391. How can we expect that a friend should keep our secret, whilst we are convincing him that it is more than we can do ourselves.

SELF-GOVERNMENT.

392. It is easier to govern than to avoid being governed. †

SELF-LOVE.

* “Ridicule excites contempt and laughter, but can never be a detector of falshood or a test of truth.” Brown against Shaftsb.

† Agricola governed his family; which many find to be a harder task than to govern a province. *Domum suam coaruit, quod plerisque haud minus, aduym est quam provinciam regere.* Tac.

SELF-LOVE.

393. Self-love is artful beyond the most artful of men.

394. Education instills into young people a second self-love.

395. Of all flatterers self-love is the greatest.

396. The first impulse of joy we feel from the good-fortune of a friend, proceeds neither from good-nature, nor friendship; it is the effect of self-love, which flatters us with the hope of being happy in our turn, or of being benefited from the prosperity of our friend.

397. Self-love, just as it happens to be well or ill conducted, constitutes virtue or vice.

398. Human prudence, rightly understood, is circumspect enlightened self-love.

399. We are so prepossessed in our own favour, as often to mistake for virtues

virtues certain vices that bear some resemblance to them, and which self-love artfully disguises. †

400. Notwithstanding all the discoveries that have been made in the regions of self-love, still there remains much *terra incognita*.

401. Self-love magnifies, or diminishes, the good qualities of a friend, in proportion to the satisfaction we take in them; and we judge of his merit by the terms he keeps with us.

402. Nothing is so capable of diminishing self-love, as the observation, that we disapprove at one time what we approve at another.

403. Self never reigns so absolutely as in the passion of love: we are ever ready to sacrifice the peace of those we adore,

† “Species virtutibus similes.” Tac. A. xv. seeming virtues.

“ Ipsa vitia pro virtutibus interpretamur.” Tac. A. i. We mistake vices for virtues.

adore, rather than disturb the least particle of our own.

404. Self, in some people, is so predominant, that, when in love, they are more taken up with the passion, than the object of it.

405. Self-love is the love of self, and of every thing for its sake. When fortune gives the means, Self-love idolizes self, and tyrannizes over others. † It never rests nor fixes any where from home. If it settle on external

K 2

things,

† Self-love is the spring of all animal action. Nature has implanted it in animals with a two-fold view: the good of the individual, and that of the species: and operates on them by a two-fold impulle; an insupportable uneasiness attendant on its suppression, and a pleasurable sensation annexed to its gratification. In brutes, this motive to action, being under the sole direction of instinct, is in general uniform and evident. In man, instinct has been superadded to reason, and self-love becomes complex and mysterious. It is plain, from fact, that all animals are in some degree social; some of them, if we may so speak, living under monarchical, some oligarchical, others democratical, and the rest patriarchal government. The stifling

things, it is only to extract, as the bee doth from flowers, whatever may be serviceable. Nothing so impetuous as its desires; nothing so secret as its designs; nothing so artful as its conduct! Its subtileness is inexpressible: its metamorphoses surpass those of Ovid, and its refinements those of chemistry. We can neither fathom the depth, nor penetrate the obscurity of its abyss. There, concealed from the most piercing eye, it

or exerting the principle that thus unites them, has always its concomitant pain or pleasure. And instinct, where she is sole governess, impels them invariably and unerringly to nature's end and their own good; which are always united, though not always, absolutely the same. For example, animals eat to appease their hunger, or please their palate; they have no more view to sustenance, than the sexes, in their intercourse, have to propagation. Men, too, so far as they act under instinct, act unerringly; when that leaves them, they have recourse to reason; which not being at all times, nor in all persons, equally right and strong, does not always prompt to what is equally true and just. Society is undoubtedly the interest of all mankind, and though a universal government has never yet been, nor most probably ever will be formed, yet the

it makes numberless turnings and windings. There—it is often invisible even to itself. There—it conceives, breeds, and cherishes, without being sensible of it, an infinity of different inclinations; some so monstrous, that it either knows them not when brought forth, or cannot prevail on itself to own them. From the gross darkness that envelopes it, springs the ridiculous notion entertained of itself. Thence its errors,

K 3

ignorance,

the wants of every man make him confederate with, and join himself to, some particular public. Now, as in order to the establishment of a state it is indispensably necessary to supersede some private rights, which are indeed compensated reflectively, though in a less obvious manner, this seems to produce cases, wherein the good of the government and that of the subject clash. And certainly there are occasionally instances where the necessities of the commonwealth bear so hard on particular members as would give them a distaste to society, did not the uniting principle, the love of the species, the affection for the community; or which they are a part, lighten the oppression, sooth the grievance, and, by benevolent reflection, even render it pleasurable. To actions deduced from this source, the self-love of the rest of the community (which

reeps

ignorance, and silly mistakes. Thence sensations are imagined dead, which yet are but asleep. It sits down quietly when only taking breath for a new chace: and thinks all appetite lost because for the present rather fated. But the thick mist which hides it from itself, hinders it not from seeing perfectly whatever is without; thus resembling the eye, that sees all things except itself. In great concerns and important

reaps the benefit of these seeming self sacrifices) ascribes extraordinary merit, annexes attendant glory, and calls them virtuous; which virtue, relatively to the kind, though it be highly meritorious, is yet not disinterested, because repaid by the reflex pleasure of the actor: and may also be carried so far as to become irrational and vicious; for "to be virtuous," says Lord Shaftsbury, "is to have one's affections right in respect of one's self, as well as of society." So that virtue is found to be, not a disinterested benevolence towards the species, but of that sort which is its own reward; not a boundless enthusiasm for the public, but the social affection conducted by reason. It is a rational humanity; or, according to our author, *well regulated self-love*. And thus,

"True self-love and social are the same."

tant affairs, where the violence of desire summoneth the whole attention, it sees, perceives, understands, invents, penetrates, and divines all things.— One would be tempted to suspect that each passion had its respective magic. No cement so close and strong as its attachments; which in vain it attempts to break or dissolve even upon impending misery. Yet sometimes, what could not, for years, be accomplished with the cruelest efforts, are affected without trouble. Whence we conclude, that by itself are its desires inflamed, rather than by the beauty and merit of the objects; that its own taste heightens and embellishes them; that itself is the game it pursues: and its own inclination followed, rather than the things which seem to be the objects of inclination. Composed of contraries, it is imperious and obedient, sincere and hypocritical, merciful and cruel, timid and bold. Its inclinations, according to different tempers, devote it some-

sometimes to glory, sometimes to wealth, sometimes to pleasure. These change as age and experience alter. Whether it has really many inclinations, or one only, is matter of indifference; because it can split itself into many, or collect itself into one, just as is convenient or agreeable. Inconstant and numberless are the changes, besides those that happen from external causes. Inconstant through levity, through love through novelty, through society, through disgust, through inconstancy itself. Capricious, and labouring with eagerness and incredible pains, to obtain what is no ways advantageous, nay even hurtful; yet pursued merely as a present affection.—Whimsical, and often exerting intense application, in employments the most trifling; delighting in the most insipid, and preserving all its haughtiness in the most contemptible. Attendant on all ages and conditions; living every where; on every thing; on nothing.—Easy
either

either in enjoyment, or want; joining those who are at variance with it; entering into their schemes; and, wonderful! hated itself, conspiring its own destruction, labouring to be undone, desiring meanly to exist, and, that granted, consents to be its own enemy. We are not therefore to be surprised, if sometimes closing with the most rigid austerity, it enters boldly into a combination against itself; because what is lost in one respect, is regained in another. We think it relinquishes pleasures, when it only suspends, or changes them; and even when discomfited, and we seem to be rid of it, we find it triumphant in its own defeat.—Such is self-love! and man's life a strong, a continual agitation! The sea is its representative—in the flux and reflux of whose waves self-love may behold a lively representation of the turbulent succession of the thoughts, and the eternal commotions of the mind.

SENSATIONS.

SENSATIONS.

406. It is less difficult to feign sensations which we have not, than to conceal those which we have.

SIMPLICITY.

407. Affected simplicity is refined imposture.*

SINCERITY.

408. Sincerity is that openness of heart which is rarely to be found. It is commonly personated by a refined dissimulation, the end of which is to procure confidence.

SLANDER.

409. We commonly slander more through vanity than malice.

SOBRIETY.

* “ Domitianus simplicitatis ac modestiæ imagine studium literarum & amorem carminum simulabat; quo velaret animum, & fratris æmulationi subduceretur.” Tac. A. iv. Domitian, under the mask of simplicity and modesty, affected the love of letters and poetry, the better to conceal his designs, and avoid his brother's jealousy.

SOBRIETY.

410. Sobriety is either the love of health, or the incapacity for debauch.

THE SOUL.

411. The health of the soul is as precarious as that of the body. When we seem most secure from the passions, we are no less in danger of their infection than we are of falling ill, when we appear to be in good health.

412. The distempers of the soul, as well as those of the body; are liable to relapses: thus we mistake for a cure what is no more than an intermission, or a change of disease. †

413. The flaws of the soul resemble the wounds of the body: the scar
always

† "Dilatæ voluptates, dissimulata luxuria, falsæ virtutes, & vitia reditura." Tac. H. i. Suspendid pleasures, and disguised passions, are false virtues, or vices that will certainly return.

always appears, and there is a danger of its breaking out again.

TALKATIVENESS.

414. We speak little when vanity prompteth us not.

415. The excessive pleasure we feel in talking of ourselves, should make us apprehensive that we afford little to our auditors.

416. It is acknowledged that we should not talk of our wives; but we seem not to know that we should talk still less of ourselves.

417. We chuse rather to talk ill of ourselves than not to talk at all.

418. Never is it more difficult to speak well than when we are ashamed of our silence.

TASTE.

419. It is as common for men to change their taste, as it is uncommon for them to change their inclination.

420. A good

420. A good taste is more the effect of judgment than of understanding.

421. We give up our interest sooner than our taste

422. Our taste declines with our merit.

423. Self-love bears less patiently the condemnation of our taste than that of our opinion.

TITLES.

424. Titles, instead of exalting, debase those who know not how to support them.

TRUTH.

425. Truth itself is less beneficial than its mere appearances are prejudicial.

426. Even our enemies, in the judgement they form of us, come nearer to truth, than we do, in the judgement we form of ourselves.

L

VALOUR.

VALOUR.

427. The love of glory, the fear of shame, the design of making a fortune, the desire of rendering life easy and agreeable, and the humour of humbling other people, are often the causes of that valour so celebrated by mankind.

428. Valour in private soldiers is a hazardous trade, taken up in order to get a livelihood.

429. Perfect valour, and perfect cowardice, are extremes, which, in the same men, are seldom experienced. The intermediate space is prodigious, and contains all the different species of courage, which are as various as our faces and humours. There are those, who at the beginning of an action expose themselves boldly; but slacken and are disheartened on its duration. There are others who just aim at preserving their honour. Some are at all times equally exempt from fear. Some fall occasionally into a general panic.

panic. Some advance to the charge because they dare not continue in their post. There are men who are inspired by small dangers, and by them hardened for greater. Some, brave at the sword, are fearful of a musket; others, defying the musket, dread the sword. The various kinds of valour agree in this, that might, augmenting fear, conceals good or bad actions, and affords the opportunity of sparing one's self. There is yet a more general discretion: we find that those who do most, would do more still, were they sure of getting off safe. It is very plain, therefore, that the fear of death strikes a damp to courage.

430. Perfect valour consists in doing without witness, all that we should be capable of doing before the whole world. §

L 2

431. In

§ Valour is the contempt of death and pain.
 “Pleraque cœpta initiis valida, spatio languescunt.”
 Tac. A. iii. Most enterprises that are brisk at first,

431. In war, most men expose themselves sufficiently to save their honour, but few so much as is necessary to succeed even in the design for which they thus expose themselves.

432. No man can answer for his courage who has never been in danger.

433. A wise man had rather avoid an engagement than embrace a conquest.

VANITY.

434. It is our own vanity that makes the vanity of others intolerable. §

435. Though vanity overturns not the virtues, it certainly makes them totter.

436. The

first, languish towards the conclusion. "Obscurum noctis obtentus fugientibus." Tac. H. ii. The darkness of the night is a protection to run-aways. "Major vitæ quam gloriæ cupido." Tac. A. iv. We love life more than glory.

§ "Adeo familiare est hominibus, omnia sibi ignoscere, nihil aliis remitteret." *Paterc.* l. ii. We overlook all faults in ourselves, but none in others.

436. The most violent passions have their intermissions: but vanity gives us no respite.

437. The pangs of shame and jealousy are sharp indeed, for vanity affords no assistance in supporting them.

438. Vanity, more than reason, induces us to act against inclination.

VICE.

439. When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we have left them. †

440. Vices enter into the composition of virtues, as poison into that of medicines. Prudence mixes and tempers, and uses the compound against the ills of life, with success.

441. We are not often possessed wholly by a single vice: the reason is, we are distracted by several.

L 3

VIOLENCE.

† The vices wait for us through life, like hosts with whom we are obliged successively to take up our lodging. It is uncertain, were we twice to take the same journey, whether experience itself would teach us to avoid them.

VIOLENCE.

442. Violence inflicted by others is often less painful than that which we inflict on ourselves.

443. The violence we do to ourselves in order to prevent love, is often more rigorous than the cruelty of a mistress.

VIRTUE.

444. Our virtues are commonly vices disguised.

445. We mistake for virtue what is often no more than that concurrence of actions and interests, which fortune, or industry, disposes to advantage. It is not always from the principle of valour, and chastity, that men are valiant, or that women are chaste.

446. Prosperity is a stronger trial of virtue than adversity.

447. The virtues are lost in self-interest, as rivers are lost in the sea.

448. To the honour of virtue it must be acknowledged, that our greatest misfortunes are the effects of our vices.

449. We despise not all those who have vices—yet do we despise all those who have no virtues.

450. Virtue would not go far, were vanity not to bear her company.*

451. Nature seems to have prescribed to every man at his birth, the bounds both of his virtues and vices.

452. Bad as men are, they dare not appear to be open enemies to virtue: when therefore virtue is persecuted, it is represented as counterfeit, or some crime is laid to its charge.

UNDERSTANDING.

453. Strength and weakness of mind are improper terms; they are in reality the

* “Tolle ambitionem & fastuosos spiritus, nullos hebebis nec Platones, nec Catones, nec Scævolis, nec Scipiones, nec Fabricios.” Take away ambition and vanity, and where will be your heroes or patriots. Seneca.

the good or ill disposition of the organs of the body.

454. It is a common error to be never satisfied with our fortune, nor dissatisfied with our understanding.

455. Politeness of mind consists in a courteous and delicate conception.

456. It often happens, that things present themselves to the mind more finished, than we, with much labour, can make them.

457. The defects of the mind, like those of the face, grow worse as we grow old.

458. The understanding is better employed in bearing actual misfortune, than in penetrating into that which possibly may befall us.

459. It is not so much through a fertility of invention that we occasionally find expedients, as through a poverty of judgement, which makes us listen to every thing that imagination presents, and hinders us from discerning what is best.

460. A man

460. A man of sense finds less difficulty in submitting to one who is wrong-headed, than in attempting to set him right.

461. Labours of the body free us from pains of the mind. This it is that constitutes the happiness of the poor.*

462. The mind between idleness and constancy, fixes on what is easy and agreeable. This habit sets bounds to our inquiries. No man was ever at the trouble to stretch his genius as far it would go.

463. Small

• • “ It is certain that as in the body, when no
 “ labour or natural exercise is used, the spirits,
 “ which want their due employment, turn against
 “ the constitution, and find work for themselves
 “ in a destructive way; so in a soul, or mind,
 “ unexercised, and which languishes for want of
 “ action and employment, the thoughts and affec-
 “ tions, being obstructed in their due course, and
 “ deprived of their natural energy, raise disquiet,
 “ and foment a rancorous eagerness and torment-
 “ ing irritation. The temper from hence becomes
 “ more impotent in passion, more incapable of real
 “ moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily
 “ takes fire by the least spark.”

Ld. Shaftsbury. v. 2.

463. Small geniuses are hurt by small events: great geniuses look through and despise them.

UNTRUTH.

464. An aversion to untruth, is often an imperceptible ambition to give weight to our own affirmations.

WEAKNESS.

465. Weakness is the only fault that is incorrigible. †

466. To virtue weakness is more opposite than is vice itself.

467. Men are treacherous oftner through weakness than design.

468. Weak

† It is, however, the fault of Nature, for which a man is just as blamable as a vessel is for being faulty, i. e. defective.

Lord Chesterfield says, that men are more unwilling to have their weaknesses and imperfections known than their crimes: and that if you hint to a man that you think him ignorant, silly, or even ill-bred or awkward, he will hate you more and longer than if you tell him plainly you think him a rogue. Let. 129.

468. Weak people are incapable of sincerity.

469. More men are guilty of treason through weakness than studied design.

470. If there be a man whose weak side has never been discovered, it is because we have never accurately searched for it. †

471. Silence is the happiest course for a man who is diffident of himself.

WEARINESS.

472. We boast that we are never out of spirits; yet are we too much conceited to own ourselves ever to be bad company.

473. We

† Lord Chesterfield seems to have had this maxim full in view when he wrote his 97th Letter. He tells us, that every body has a prevailing weakness; that Cardinal Richelieu, the ablest of Statesmen, had the idle vanity to be thought the best poet too; that Sir Robert Walpole's prevailing weakness was to be thought to have a polite and happy turn to gallantry, of which he had undoubtedly less than any man living; and those who had any penetration applied to it with success.

473. We easily forgive those who weary us; but we never forgive those who are wearied by us.

474. We are almost always wearied with the company of those very persons with whom we ought never to be so.

WISDOM.

475. Our chief wisdom consists in being sensible of our foibles.*

476. Our wisdom (as much as our wealth) is at the mercy of fortune. §

477. To be wise for others is easier than to be wise for ourselves. †

478. Some

* —“ Sapiencia prima (est)

“ Stultitia caruisse ” — Horat.

Ev'n in our flights from vice some virtue lies,
And free from folly, we to wisdom rise.

§ “ Res adversæ consilium adimunt ” Tac.
A. xi. Adversity deprives men of their reason.

† —“ Ita quæso (dii vestram fidem!)

“ Itane comparatam esse hominum naturam omnium,

“ Alena ut melius videant & dijudicent

“ Quam

478. Some persons of weak understanding, are sensible enough of their weakness to make a wise use of it.

479. Wisdom is to the mind what health is to the body. §

WIT.

480. In conversation confidence has a greater share than wit.

481. No fools are so troublesome as those who have some wit.

482. Those who have but one sort of wit are sure not to please long.

M

483. Wit

“ *Quam sua! An eo fit, qui in re nostra aut*
“ *gaudio*

“ *Sumus præpediti nimia, aut ægritudine!*”

Gods! that the nature of mankind is such,
To see and judge of the affairs of others
Much better than their own! Is't therefore so,
Because that in our own concerns, we feel
The influence of joy and grief too nearly?

Ter.

§ “ *Mens sana in corpore sano.*”

Juv.

Forgive the Gods the rest, and stand consist'd
To health of body and content of mind.

483. Wit sometimes tempts us to play the fool with great courage. §

484. It is the characteristic of great wits to say much in few words; small wits seem to have the gift of speaking much and saying nothing. †

485. Those are mistaken who imagine wit and judgement to be distinct matters. Judgement is only the perfection of wit; which penetrates into the recesses of things, observes all that merits observation, and perceives what seems imperceptible. We must therefore agree, that it is extensive wit
which

§ It is by vivacity and wit that a man shines in company; but trite jokes and loud laughter reduce him to a buffoon. *Ld. Chesterfield's Letter 134.*

† (Ceux) "qui parlent beaucoup, ne disent jamais rien." *Boileau, Ep. ix.* People who talk much say nothing. Or, as *Terence* expresses it:

"Næ ista hercle magno jam conatu magnas
"nugas dixerit." *Heautontim.*

... "She'll take mighty pains
"To be delivered of some mighty triff."

Colman.

which produces all the effects attributed to judgement. §

486. A man of wit would be often at a loss, were it not for the company of fools.

WOMEN.

487. Women effect coyness, as an addition to beauty.

488. Women often fancy themselves to be in love when they are not. The amusement of an intrigue, the emotion of mind produced by gallantry, their natural passion to being beloved, and an unwillingness to give a denial; from all these they imagine themselves in love, when in fact they are only coquetting.

M 2 489. Women

§ This is a more rational account of wit and judgment than that of those antient philosophers who make diametrical opposites of two mental operations, which, if not strictly the same, are at least inseparably united; for nothing can be witty that is not judicious.

489. Women are completely cruel only to those they hate.

490. The wit of most women serves rather to fortify her folly than her reason.*

491. There are those who, like new songs, are favourites only for a time.

492. The virtue of women is often no more than the love of reputation and quiet.

493. There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profession.

494. Virtuous women are like concealed treasures, they are secure because nobody seeks after them.

495. A woman keeps her first lover long, if she happens not to take a second.

496. To

* "Women have an entertaining tattle, and sometimes wit; but for solid reasoning and good sense, I never knew one in my life that had it, or who reasoned and acted consequentially for four-and twenty hours together."

Ld. Chesterfield's Let. 129.

496. To women, youth without beauty, is of as little consequence as beauty without youth.

497. The common foible of woman who once was handsome, is to forget that she is now no longer so.*

498. Most women yield more through weakness than passion; whence it happens that an enterprising rather than an amiable man commonly succeeds best with them. §

M 3

499. Of

* “ Every woman who is not absolutely ugly, thinks herself handsome. The suspicion of age no woman, let her be ever so old, ever forgives. No flattery is either too high or too low for them. They will greedily swallow the highest, and gratefully accept of the lowest: and you may safely flatter any woman, from her understanding, down to the exquisite taste of her fan.”

Ld. Chesterfield's Let. 129. 181.

§ “ Whenever the slightest wishes arise, the rest will soon follow.” Again, “ If you are not listened to the first time, try a second, a third, and a fourth. If the place is not already ready

499. Of all the violent passions that which least becomes a woman is love.

500. In their first desires women love the love, afterwards the passion.

501. That woman is much to be pitied who at once possesses both love and virtue.

YOUTH.

502. Youth changes its inclinations through heat of blood; old-age perseveres in it through habit.

503. Youth is continual intoxication. It is the fever of reason.

504. Young

“ ready taken, depend upon it, it may be conquered ” Lett. 218. 224.

It is difficult to say whether our author or Lord Chesterfield has been hardest upon the sex. His Lordship however (among other douceurs) acknowledges, that “ Women are the only refiners of the merit of men; that it is true they cannot add weight, but they polish and give a lustre; that they absolutely stamp every man’s character in the *bien monde*, and make it either current, or cry it down, and stop it in payment.” Lett. 129. 218

504. Young people, at the entrance upon the world, should be either bashful or giddy; a composed self-sufficiency generally turns to impertinence.

505. Timidity is a fault which is dangerous to reprehend in those we would reform.*

* Because temerity, its opposite, is a fault equally dangerous, and it is difficult to draw the line.

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